In the nearly half-century of correspondence between the Burnelli Company and the Department of the Defense, the latter has been very consistent.  They've stonewalled and played every bureaucratic trick in the book, and much to their discredit, they're still stonewalling.  The knowledge that this is the DOD's tactic is so pervasive that even cartoonists use it as a subject. 

(Remember: for something to be funny, there has to be some truth to it and the audience has to have some knowledge as to its veracity) 

Despite the cartoon, this is no joke.  The reason for the stonewalling goes back to the intimate relationship between the military and industry (otherwise known as the 'military-industrial complex' a term coined by President Eisenhower).  Military and industry look after their own interests first and foremost. 

The interest of the people (who are paying for all of this) is secondary as is evidenced by:

1. the 'save-harmless clause,' - discussed in the introduction
2. the various letters from manufacturers proving that this way of shifting liability to the D.O.D. (Department of Defense) for theft of technology is still the norm,
   • 1984 McDonnell Douglas letter
   • 1963 Boeing letter 
   • 1964 Ling-Temco-Vought letter.
3.  the theft of Burnelli technology for use on the most advanced military aircraft
4. and the simultaneous refusal to overturn the 1941 report which states among other things that "That the Burnelli 'lifting fuselage' design does not offer sufficient new or novel ideas of military value to warrant the construction of experimental or production airplanes". 

Since the correspondence from the Department of Defense has been so consistent we've chosen to start by uploading the most recent correspondence as a typical example of how they've behaved thus far.  (As time permits, we'll start uploading older correspondence.)

Mr. Goodlin's letter of July 14, 1999 included all of the information needed to see that the 1941 report is clearly a falsification of facts.  Yet, Secretary Cohen deferred responding to a subordinate who, on August 4, 1999 wrote an almost identical letter to his predecessors letter of August 24, 1998. 

Finally, on August 27, 1999 , Burnelli's Mr. Goodlin, in a concilatory effort to finally get this issue settled, asked Secretary Cohen to have the USAF's most senior aeronautical engineer sign an affidavit stating the validity or invalidity of the 1941 report as the case may be (copy of affidavit is enclosed below the letter).  This would settle the matter, wouldn't it?

To date, the Burnelli Company has received no answer at all from either Secretary Cohen or the D.O.D. despite a reminder letter dated October 7, 1999 

We'll keep you posted.